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Abstract
We observe that approaches to intersubjectivity, involving mirror neurons and 
involving emulation and prediction, have eclipsed discussion of those same mecha-
nisms for achieving coordination between the two hemispheres of the human brain. 
We explore some of the implications of the suggestion that the mutual modelling 
of the two situated hemispheres (each hemisphere ‘second guessing’ the other) is a 
productive place to start in understanding the phylogenetic and ontogenetic develop-
ment of cognition and of intersubjectivity.
Keywords Hemisphericity · Intersubjectivity · Mirror neurons · Predictive 
processing · Emulation
Research on intersubjectivity has received influential contributions from two sources 
over recent decades. First, from research on the mirror neuron system (MNS) (e.g. 
Fadiga et  al. 1995; Gallese et  al. 1996). Second, from the resurgence of interest 
in emulation and prediction (e.g. Clark 2013; Friston 2005; Grush 2004; Rao and 
Ballard 1999; Lee and Mumford 2003). In both cases, specific mechanisms have 
been proposed as foundational for much of what is understood as intersubjectivity. 
In this paper we highlight the fact that this concentration on intersubjectivity has 
been at the expense of what we can call intrasubjectivity—the necessary coordina-
tion of the activity of the two hemispheres of the human brain. We claim that the 
relevant mechanisms of the MNS and of emulation and prediction (or ‘modelling,’ 
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more broadly) can be productively seen as mechanisms of hemispheric coordination 
that are in many ways prior to and foundational for intersubjectivity and for wider 
cognition. This view of the development of human cognition, both phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic, sees each hemisphere ‘second-guessing’ the other in a largely shared 
external and internal (embodied) context.
1  The Hemispheric Divide
Initially, we establish why it is important to consider hemisphericity in connection 
with the uniqueness of human cognition. First, there is the increasing independence 
of the two hemispheres in non-primate and primate evolution (Aboitiz and Mon-
tiel 2003; Hopkins and Rilling 2000; Ringo et al. 1994; Rilling and Insel 1999), as 
defined by the size relation of the corpus callosum and the neocortex. Larger brains 
do not have proportionately more callosal connections.1
Second, asymmetry. A vertical axis of symmetry began at least in the Burgess 
Shale. Asymmetry of structure/function about the vertical midline is widespread 
(e.g. Denenberg 1981; MacNeilage et al. 2009), from nematode worms (Hobert et al. 
2002), through to great apes (Quaresmini et al. 2014). However, this asymmetry is 
greatest in human lateral cerebral specialization: “Nowhere in the animal kingdom 
is there such rampant specialization of function” (Gazzaniga 2000, p. 1294).
Third, there is the very plastic interdependence of the two hemispheres. Callosal 
agenesis and related disorders have very variable effects on cognition, sometimes 
having no apparent effects on IQ and at other times profoundly impairing it (Chi-
arello 1980; Sauerwein et al. 1994). Actual hemispherectomy sometimes seems not 
to have such drastic consequences as might be imagined (e.g. Pulsifer et al. 2004). 
Adult callosotomy produces the well-known disconnection syndrome, in which the 
individual is left paradoxically intact, requiring ingenious experiments to reveal the 
cognitive implications of the severing of the corpus callosum (e.g., Gazzaniga 2005; 
Gazzaniga et al. 1962, 1963, 1965; Gazzaniga and Sperry 1967; Sperry 1964). Even 
here, though, there seems to be individual variation in its effects on, for example, 
resting state activity (see Johnson et al. 2008; Uddin et al. 2008). This very variabil-
ity of hemispheric interaction alerts us to its potential.
Schechter (2015) rehearses the route by which psychologists (including ‘folk 
psychologists’) readily accepted the duality of the brain and its functions follow-
ing the influential split-brain studies (e.g. Sperry 1965; Bogen 1969; Gazzaniga 
1970), whereas philosophers have been more sceptical that the mind can be simi-
larly divided (e.g. Hurley 2002; Marks 1981; Tye 2003). Schechter makes the case 
for the callosal syndrome observed in split-brain individuals involving the hemi-
spheres operating independently and being mediated by “effection and transduction” 
1 Although humans have easily the greatest hemispheric independence compared with evolutionarily 
related species, Rilling and Insel note even greater hemispheric independence in delphinid cetaceans, but 
without relatively sophisticated cognition. Other factors are necessary—possibly having an ever-increas-
ing spiral of problems to solve in the world and the artefacts with which to solve them.
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(behavior and sensation), and hence qualifying as “two minds.” In other work, she 
addresses the unity of consciousness and argues that “a subject might possess a sin-
gle stream of consciousness that was still disunified, or a significantly unified con-
sciousness that was nonetheless comprised of multiple streams of consciousness” 
(Schechter 2013, p. 214). To ground out some of these intuitions anatomically, 
Schechter takes as candidate cognizing entities “R and L, where R is the entire sub-
ject minus the left hemisphere and L is the entire split-brain subject minus the right 
hemisphere” (p. 513), citing Davis (1997).
In short, hemisphericity in humans is a point of maximal departure from even the 
highest other primates. The two hemispheres exhibit surprising levels of independ-
ence and plasticity. Their coordination is a necessity and is replete with possibilities, 
both philosophical and psychological.
2  The Range of Inter‑hemispheric Connectivity
The apparent unity of consciousness encourages cognitive scientists to view the 
normal brain as a neuronally mediated whole, with callosal (and other) connectiv-
ity underlying the apparent equipotentiality of metacognition and consciousness. 
Theorists taking an abstract computational perspective have conventionally thought 
of disembodied information washing backwards and forwards between the hemi-
spheres, also making the brain effectively a single domain (e.g. Reggia et al. 1998).
The sheer range of anatomical connectivity between the hemispheres supports 
the view of the brain as a single domain. Although the corpus callosum is the most 
conspicuous commissure, it is not alone (cf. Trevarthen 1990) and others may com-
pensate for it (e.g. Loeser and Alvord 1968; although see Kingstone and Gazzan-
iga 1995). Recent years have seen an appreciation of the role of the cerebellum in 
cognition (e.g. Middleton and Strick 2000); the cerebellum has left–right structure 
and predominantly unilateral connectivity, but there is also ipsilateral connectivity 
(Glickstein 2009; Savaki et al. 1996). There is rich subcortical connectivity between 
the two sides of the nervous system, also interacting vertically with the respective 
cerebral hemispheres (e.g. Pashler et al. 1994). The totality of routes by which the 
two hemispheres coordinate themselves inescapably involves the outside world: cal-
losal, cerebral and subcortical connections directly or indirectly involve all sorts of 
sensory data; changing eye-fixation to inspect different parts of the world moves the 
visual contents of one hemifield/hemisphere to the other hemisphere; autonomic 
nervous system activity affects the bodily state available to both hemispheres (Gaz-
zaniga 2002, p. 210); kinaesthetic and proprioceptive functioning embody informa-
tion about whole-body posture and activity; self-directed speech can organize activ-
ity; the individual’s physical interaction with the world of people and artefacts can 
mediate hemispheric interaction, as in the split-brain ‘cross-cueing’ examples (the 
right hemisphere [RH] instructs the left hand to stroke an unseen comb, and the 
left hemisphere [LH] verbally identifies the sound); we see an enlargement of the 
anterior corpus callosum in musicians trained from their early years, suggesting that 
particular activity can forge closer coordination between the hemispheres (Schlaug 
et al. 1995).
 Axiomathes
1 3
These various communication routes between the two sides of the nervous system 
still do not necessitate regarding the brain as a unified whole, however. For instance, 
Whitteridge (1965) reports that neurons earlier in the visual pathway need to have a 
receptive field that contains a representation of the midline between the two hemi-
fields for them to have a callosal projection; in this way the corpus callosum draws 
together the two separate hemifield curtains of the visual field into a single, uni-
fied visual experience. The farther we move up the visual pathways from the sen-
sory input to the higher visual areas, the more we find neurons with receptive fields 
that respond to both left and right hemifields, as opposed to solely the contralateral 
hemifield, although we typically still see a stronger contralateral response (Berluc-
chi and Antonini 1990). Fundamentally, though, the cleanly-divided primary visual 
cortex remains the most authoritative reflection of the visual world; it is the target of 
substantial ‘top-down’ feedback within the visual system (Felleman and Van Essen 
1991) and is intimately involved with the generation of conscious visual experience 
(Tong 2003). The callosal disconnection syndrome remains the most striking argu-
ment for the potential independence of the two hemispheres.
Overall, we see rich connectivity between the two hemispheres, co-located in the 
same internal environment of hormones, bodily postures and movements, and in the 
same external environment of sights, sounds, touches and smells. In these circum-
stances the observed degree of hemispheric differentiation is all the more striking.
Note that the individual has a degree of active control over hemispheric coordi-
nation, mediated by artefacts and social interaction. From the earliest work on cal-
losal disconnection, researchers have seen the individual’s own bodily activity as 
crucial to cerebral unity (e.g. Sperry et al. 1969, p. 286), but we should also consider 
its potential role in keeping distinct the activities of the two hemispheres; in this 
respect, individual- (as opposed to population-) level handedness is a very human 
characteristic (Amunts et al. 2000; Cashmore et al. 2008; Cavanagh et al. 2015).
We have seen that the hemispheric divide, together with the structural and func-
tion asymmetry it allows, is a salient material feature of the human brain. It necessi-
tates coordination. We have also seen rich hemispheric connectivity, but without any 
recognizable, principled mechanism (with the possible exception of head-turning to 
‘transfer’ visual information). Thus far, hemisphericity looks like a problem. In what 
sense does it represent an opportunity?
3  Hemispheric Homology and Bandwidth
Before we can approach the mutual modelling that we will claim is the opportunity 
present in hemisphericity, we need to review two more respects in which the hemi-
spheric divide is special. Why is the division between two individuals, or between 
any two distinct brain regions, not at least as important as the division between the 
hemispheres? Why is the latter so important?
The key arguments concern homology and bandwidth. Homology refers to the 
two hemispheres being structural mirror-images. Functional hemispheric differ-
ences exist in the neonate (Witelson and Pallie 1973) and also emerge over devel-
opment (e.g. Mevorach et  al. 2005), producing different parameterizations of the 
1 3
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hemispheres (e.g. Beeman et al. 1994), but, even given the existence of an eventual 
hemispheric division of labour potentially presided over by Levy and Trevarthen’s 
(1976) “metacontrol”, each hemisphere is fundamentally capable of doing more or 
less anything its partner can do, albeit sometimes not quite as well (cf. Beeman and 
Chiarello 1998; Hertz-Pannier et al. 2002).
Even given the plasticity of the neocortex (Kolb and Whishaw 1989), homology 
does not occur anywhere near as fully in, for instance, the relationship between the 
frontal cortex and the inferior temporal cortex, or in any other subsidiary relation-
ship within the nervous system. The homology between the hemispheres is maxi-
mal, and of special significance.
Surely the homology argument applies between subjects? As with the hemi-
spheres, each individual is fundamentally capable of doing more or less anything 
another individual can do. Surely the range of the homology between individual 
subjects is greater than between hemispheres?
There are two points to make. First, adult caregivers can do a lot, infants can do 
very little, so any activity-mediated homology is limited. Neither infant hemisphere 
can control many actions, but the given homology between them is nevertheless 
considerable. Clearly the homology between adult caregiver and infant increases 
during development, and the relationship between two adult subjects eventually 
encompasses the whole culture. Understanding that relationship is an ultimate goal 
of cognitive scientists, but our central argument here is that this understanding is 
productively approached through considering hemispheric coordination.
Second, even a face-to-face homology between two independent subjects, is still 
appropriately thought of in hemispheric terms. When Subject A centrally fixates 
Subject B’s face, then the contralateral projection of the vertically divided visual 
field to A’s hemispheres means that A’s right and left hemispheres are ‘directly 
speaking to’ B’s left and right hemispheres, respectively, given that B’s face (and 
body) are primarily contralaterally controlled by B’s cortical hemispheres. This rela-
tionship between the hemispheres of different individuals recapitulates the prior, 
much more intimate relationship between A’s own RH and LH. (We might consider 
the ‘mirror twins’ Greta and Freda Chaplin—anecdotally reported by Brook and 
Raymont 2017—as the atypical extreme of the mutual entrainment of two pairs of 
hemispheres.)
In addition to homology, understanding hemispheric coordination requires us 
to consider the bandwidth of the interactions. Eliasmith (2008, p. 150), Chalmers 
(2008, p. xii) and Clark (2009, pp. 983–984) all refer to “bandwidth”—the speed 
and richness of interaction—as an argument for restricting to the brain that which is 
constitutive of consciousness. An analogous bandwidth argument applies to hemi-
spheric interaction. Interhemispheric interaction is necessarily richer than most of 
the interactions between domains smaller than the hemispheres. Interaction between 
two subjects is necessarily sparse and relatively slow; however, it is ‘high-level’—as 
in language. But even this case does not necessarily beat hemispheric interaction for 
richness, as self-talk can still organize cognition.
Only very general principles of the how? and the where? of hemispheric inter-
action have emerged (cf. Davis and Cabeza 2015), and then only slowly, from 
what was long seen as a broadly homotopic and inhibitory relationship between 
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the hemispheres (cf. Chiarello and Maxfield 1996; Cook 1986; Marcano-Reik and 
Blumberg 2008). Why is there not more transparent functional motivation in the 
connectivity of the corpus callosum? How much detailed hardwiring should we 
expect?
A growing number of studies involving brain-to-brain interfaces show that very 
broad-brush ways of picking up information from a ‘sending’ brain and of influ-
encing a ‘receiving’ brain can be effective in enabling purposeful communications 
between two rat brains (Pais–Vieira et al. 2013), between a human brain and a rat 
brain (Yoo et al. 2013), and between two human brains (Rao et al. 2014; see, also, 
Min et al. 2010). Given the number of callosal connections and the range of non-
callosal physiological and anatomical routes by which one hemisphere may influ-
ence another, there is little doubt that there is the wherewithal for developing novel, 
effective hemisphere-to-hemisphere communication without elaborate pre-wiring. 
Indeed, such pre-wiring may make the relationship too ‘brittle’ to succeed phyloge-
netically and ontogenetically.
In summary, the interface between the two hemispheres is salient because this 
interface has maximal bandwidth and maximal opportunity for the interaction of 
processing differences. Indeed, two half-spheres with homologous structure and 
connectivity has a good claim to be the optimal compromise between difference and 
speed of interaction.2 Only minimal pre-existing structure seems to be required as a 
foundation for effective hemispheric communication.
4  Algorithmic Analogies
The fields of computational cognitive modelling, statistical physics and machine 
learning contain implementations of some of the principles considered above. There 
is a history of neural net simulations with a ‘hemispheric split’ (Anninos and Cook 
1988; Monaghan et  al. 2004; Reggia et  al. 2013; Shillcock and Monaghan 2001; 
Monaghan and Pollmann 2003; Shillcock et al. 2018; Shkuro et al. 2000), in which 
typically the two halves of the model are encapsulated, except for a set of ‘cal-
losal’ connections between the sets of hidden units. One half of the model ‘second 
guesses’ the other half.
As another example, the “complexity matching” developed by West et  al. 
(Allegrini et  al. 2006; West et  al. 2008) in the statistical physics of complex net-
works, demonstrates that there is maximal information exchange between cou-
pled complex systems each of which generates similar power-law relationships 
between variables in its own domain of processing. Cognitive scientists have applied 
2 Consider a population of red-blue dipoles, in which difference is accentuated by the relative proximity 
of all the red poles and all the blue poles, respectively. The optimum structure is a sphere of all the red 
poles and a sphere of all the blue poles. Speed is inversely proportional to the distance between the two 
poles of each dipole. The optimum structure begins as the two spheres with a one-to-one ‘straight line’ 
mapping between the poles of each dipole, which is then compressed into two half-spheres to shorten the 
distance between the poles of individual dipoles. Hemispheric homology is just the structure we expect 
as a compromise between difference and speed of interaction.
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this concept to entrainment in dyadic interactions (e.g. Abney et  al. 2014, 2015; 
Marmelat and Delignières 2012).3
Goodfellow et  al. (2014) exploit some aspects of hemisphericity in Generative 
Adversarial Networks (GANs). In a GAN, one network generates and the other dis-
criminates; the generator attempts to increase the error rate of the discriminator by 
getting it to accept spurious synthesized examples as genuine data from the training 
set. Zhang, Isola and Efros’ (2016) aptly named ‘split-brain autoencoders’ carry out 
unsupervised learning in which one channel must predict the contents of the other. 
The success of these machine-learning approaches in real-world computer vision 
tasks speaks to the utility of a general schema of interaction between two relatively 
encapsulated processors.
5  Mirror Neurons, Predictive Processing and the Hemispheres
We now look at a previously little-considered aspect of the mirror-neuron system 
(MNS)—its potential role in hemispheric communication, such that mirror neu-
rons (at least for part of their history) mediate for one hemisphere the interpreta-
tion of visible and/or audible activities controlled by the other hemisphere. Thus, for 
instance, the RH initiates reaching for the teacup with the left hand, the eyes follow 
this activity (cf. Land and Hayhoe 2001) and the LH MNS conveys to the rest of the 
LH the effective gist of the behaviour of the RH.
Researchers have studied the laterality of the MNS with respect to sense of self 
(see Uddin et  al. 2007), the origins of (left-lateralized) language (see Aziz-Zadeh 
et al. 2004; Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998), speech perception (e.g. Lotto et al. 2009), 
empathy and ‘mind-reading’ (e.g. Gallese and Goldman 1998; Iacoboni 2009), but 
very few studies have involved distinguishing stimuli and responses by hemisphere/
hemifield, with a primary research focus on the role of the hemispheres. One excep-
tion is a study by Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006), who presented egocentrically positioned 
representations of a hand in front of human participants and recorded fMRI data 
as the participant observed, imitated, or executed actions in response to the hand, 
which might or might not move to the left or right to press a button. The authors 
were testing the hypothesis that the MNS would be left-lateralized, meaning it could 
be an evolutionary precursor of spoken language. The data showed significant dif-
ferences in activity, specifically during imitation; activity in the inferior frontal and 
rostral inferior parietal cortex was stronger in the hemisphere ipsilateral to the vis-
ual stimulus and response hand. The authors saw these data as “paradoxical” (p. 
2969) in terms of the typical contralateral projections.
Increased ipsilateral activity accompanying imitation is consonant with our pro-
posal that the MNS is involved in interhemspheric coordination. However, compa-
rable MNS data remain scant (although see Levy 1977, p. 91, as cited by Schechter 
3 An associated philosophy-of-science conclusion regarding “explanatory pluralism” has been advanced 
by Abney et al. (2007), although it would appear to be at odds with the proposals regarding explanation 
implicit in the current paper.
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2015, p. 510): much MNS research has understandably been directed at non-human 
animals; hemisphericity has been largely ignored; the early development of the 
MNS, particularly relevant to the current claim, has received little attention; thresh-
olding decisions may mask bilateral activity (and in the Aziz-Zadeh study, there is 
certainly bilateral activity); the very interpretation of activity in fMRI is ambigu-
ous. Finally, as Aziz-Zadeh et al. note, there are complex departures from the stand-
ard picture of strict contralateral projection in adult non-MNS neural connectivity 
to and from the fingers and hands (Ehrsson et  al. 2000); these departures favour 
weak precision grips (Ehrsson et al. 2001) suggesting their importance for bimanual 
manipulation.
The virtually exclusive concern with intersubjectivity in MNS research is not 
true of predictive coding, or predictive processing—‘PP’, research (e.g. Leube et al. 
2003) although the primary orientation is towards interacting with others (cf. Clark 
2013; Friston 2005; Grush 2004; Rao and Ballard 1999; Lee and Mumford 2003). 
The idea that motor control, perception, imagery and beliefs might all be governed 
by internal-emulation/forward-modelling/efference-copying of the world/self/others 
has attracted wide research interest. These ideas have histories in control theory, in 
signal processing, in ‘analysis-by-synthesis’, and go at least as far back as Helm-
holtz’s (1866/2004) ideas concerning unconscious inference; they now return with 
greater mathematical and neuroscientific content.
In summary, we note the potential utility of the MNS and of prediction error 
mechanisms for hemispheric coordination and the subsequent implications for the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of cognition.
6  Conclusions: Mutual Reflection of the Two Hemispheres
We have begun to make the case that hemisphericity and the coordination it neces-
sitates is the essential material precipitator of cognition. We now develop this basic 
hypothesis.
 (1) The simplest relationship between the hemispheres is physical co-presence; 
indeed, Vesalius suggested a purely mechanical function for the corpus callo-
sum, fastening together the right and left cerebra (Clarke and O’Malley 1968). 
Physical co-presence means largely shared internal and external environments 
and a plurality of means of coordinating the two hemispheres.
 (2) One hemisphere’s domain of activity is (pretty much) the individual’s entire 
external-world together with (pretty much) the individual’s entire somatic con-
text, crucially including its partner hemisphere (cf. Schechter’s definition of R 
and L, above). These shared domains are the material ‘fulcrum’ that allows the 
interaction of the two hemispheres, with complex, re-entrant loops of activity 
that involve the brain and the world outside the brain (cf. Clark 2009; Hurley 
2002; Noë 2007; Schechter 2015; Thompson and Varela 2001).
 (3) The most complex relationship between the hemispheres is where one hemi-
sphere actively incorporates the other hemisphere’s contextualized activity into 
its own repertoire. Mutual modelling of one hemisphere by the other necessar-
1 3
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ily ensues, such that each hemisphere operates on multiply-nested assumptions 
about both hemispheres.
 (4) Nested coordinations are enhanced by hemispheric asymmetry: just as imper-
fect parallel mirrors generate idiosyncratic series of reflections, so the differ-
ently parameterized hemispheres with their lateralized specialisms have the 
capacity to create more idiosyncratic cognitive tools than would be possible in 
the symmetric case (which more resembles the other higher primates).
 (5) Although such asymmetries are observable in gene-expression differences in 
human embryos in advance of any morphological difference (Sun et al. 2005), 
in evolution and particularly in individual development they are increasingly 
mediated by artefacts (including the hands-as-tools, tools and language) and 
social interaction.
 (6) Although Sun et al.’s reported asymmetry also occurs in mice, it does so with-
out a directional preference (i.e. it operates at the individual level, producing 
a 50:50 population), as noted by Fisher and Marcus (2006). We see the begin-
nings of a critical population-wide lateralization in brain structure in non-
human primates (Cantalupo and Hopkins 2001; Gannon et al. 1998); such an 
asymmetry, as in handedness, is consonant with the brain-to-brain (or, more 
accurately, hemisphere-to-hemisphere) coordination involved in intersubjec-
tivity and collaboration, as we saw above for face-to-face collaboration. This 
situation exemplifies the prioritizing of hemispheres over whole brains in the 
theorizing we present here.
 (7) The human visual system has evolved so as to carry the hemispheric divide to 
its furthest outpost, the fovea. The vertical division and subsequent contralateral 
hemispheric projection of the visual field extends into our highest-fidelity, most 
detailed visual processing (see, e.g., Ellis and Brysbaert 2010; Shillcock et al. 
2000). The retina, including the fovea, packages up the visual world to exploit 
hemisphericity.
 (8) Hemispheric lateralization is an arms race. Hemispheric encapsulation, asym-
metry and mutual modelling create a virtuous spiral of increasingly sophis-
ticated outcomes of mutual modelling, which constitute ‘tools of cognition’. 
These hemisphere-specific tools interact in human cognitive activity.
 (9) This virtuous spiral to produce cognitive tools is a gamble. A further twist 
of the spiral (i.e. greater encapsulation, more lateralization) might achieve 
even deeper mutual modelling and more sophisticated tools to be coordinated 
between the two hemispheres, but it also risks disrupting even the current level 
of coordination. There is an inverse relation between brain lateralization and 
callosal connectivity in males (Aboitiz et al. 1992; Dorion et al. 2000; Witelson 
and Goldsmith 1991), suggesting that we should see in males a greater vari-
ability at both the upper and lower ends of the range of cognitive performance, 
which is exactly what we do see (Johnson et al. 2008). (See Shillcock et al. 
2018, for the relevant cognitive modelling.)
 (10) Cognitive scientists have conventionally prioritized ‘mindreading’/intersub-
jectivity over metacognition/‘intrasubjectivity’, even deriving the latter from 
the former (e.g. Carruthers 2009). We argue that the rich, constant 24/7 con-
nectivity between the hemispheres, grounded by perceptual duplication of 
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their input, means that they are driven to develop sophisticated models of each 
other’s activities, based on mechanisms such as the MNS and prediction-error/
emulation. The implications of this move for our understanding of cognition 
are profound.
We have traced an argument that the material requirement for the coordination 
of the two hemispheres forces the development of the wherewithal for higher cog-
nition, phylogenetically and ontogenetically. The highest achievement in the devel-
opment of cognition is arguably human consciousness. What are the implications 
of our analysis—relying on relative hemispheric autonomy—for the unity of con-
sciousness, which has been a consistent concern of philosophers (Brook and Ray-
mont 2017)? How is it that conscious experience is a single whole as opposed to an 
independent registering of different dimensions and entities? In some of the claimed 
subtypes of unity of consciousness, this issue equates to the binding problem (Hard-
castle 1998; Revonsuo 1999).
Consider that there are aspects of cognitive processing that are specific to a 
particular hemisphere. The WADA test allows the clinician to render one or other 
hemisphere of a patient inactive by introducing a barbiturate into one of the internal 
carotid arteries (Wada 1949). Patients typically anecdotally report feeling no differ-
ent from how they normally feel, but are aware of failures to comprehend language, 
to produce language, to remember test items, and to hold up an affected arm (Epi-
lepsy Foundation, Community Forum 2018). They report no memory of the affected 
hemisphere ‘coming back’. How can we understand this unified consciousness?
We see the general problem of the unity of consciousness as at least partly 
finessed by the (possibly multiply nested) mutual modelling of the two hemispheres; 
each hemisphere predicts aspects of the way that the other hemisphere interacts 
with the world. We presume that the seeming equipotential, indivisible nature of the 
WADA-test patients’ conscious awareness reflects the unaffected hemisphere’s mod-
elling of the affected hemisphere.
We have argued above that the maximal ‘bandwidth’ of the interaction between 
the hemispheres makes their role a critical one, compared with the interaction 
between smaller brain regions in the same hemisphere, for instance. However, we 
do not restrict the role for predictive processing to interhemispheric interaction. 
Considering just vision, the pervasive recurrent connectivity in the visual areas of 
the brain (cf. Felleman and Van Essen 1991), both cortical and subcortical, provide 
ample opportunity for predictive processing between different visual channels of 
information.
To illustrate, Millidge and Shillcock (2018) show that when a (‘deep learning’) 
convolutional neural network (cf. Zhang et al. 2016) is trained to make mutual pre-
dictions between different visual channels, such as the red versus green information 
in a scene, the resulting error maps (i.e. the incorrectly predicted pixels) strongly 
resemble the ‘visual salience’ maps that psychologists have used to capture where a 
viewer will fixate in a scene (e.g. Itti et al. 1998). Millidge and Shillcock reinterpret 
visual salience as visual informativeness/unpredictability.
We generalize our current position regarding the hemispheres to say that pre-
dictive processing between any and all different channels of perceptuo-cognitive 
1 3
Axiomathes 
processing serves to ‘parse’ the world and to underwrite the unity of consciousness. 
Nevertheless, because of the bandwidth observation, the hemispheric divide remains 
paramount; we have idealized the two hemispheres, in some of our considerations, 
as ‘two brains in one bodily and world context’. Another aspect of the bandwidth 
issue is the question of which hemisphere takes control in particular task circum-
stances. Levy and Trevarthen (1976) coin the term ‘metacontrol’ to describe the fact 
that the dominant hemisphere in a particular situation is not necessarily dictated by 
the respective processing strengths and abilities of the two hemispheres, but by “val-
ues, knowledge, expectations and intentions” (p. 311) intrinsic to the active subject.
Prioritizing the development of interhemispheric coordination in the understand-
ing of cognition solves the problem of how a system can recursively organize itself 
in a spiral of open-ended engagement with a world very largely shared by the two 
hemispheres while at the same time being able to bootstrap itself into more and 
more complex behaviour by virtue of those same hemispheres observing each other. 
In this sense, the hemispherically-divided brain is a self-creating and self-organizing 
system coupled to the world (cf. Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 1974) not 
just by the direct predictions of the predictive processing approach, but also by the 
computationally powerful ‘second-order’ predictions of one hemisphere predictively 
modelling the other.
In summary, we have taken the totality of the cognizing individual and their 
world and we have abstracted away everything except the two hemispheres and the 
necessity that they be coordinated. This coordination presents unique opportuni-
ties for the emergence of human cognition. Theorizing about intersubjectivity and 
‘intrasubjectivity’ in terms of hemispheres rather than whole brains is profoundly 
productive.
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